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The Safe Roads Act: The Dram Shop Provisions
A study conducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion revealed that in 1979 two million of the nation's traffic accidents were
related to alcoholic beverage consumption.' Fifty-five percent of fatal acci-
dents, twenty-five percent of nonfatal accidents, and eight percent of accidents
causing only property damage involved alcoholic beverage consumption.2
Teenage drivers who drank were involved in accidents more often than older
drivers who drank. 3 If North Carolina statistics mirror these national results,
more than half of the 1320 persons killed last year in North Carolina traffic
accidents 4 died in alcohol-related crashes. The North Carolina General As-
sembly responded to the problem of underage drunken drivers by enacting
dram shop provisions5 as part of the 1983 Safe Roads Act.6 The dram shop
provisions7 allow persons injured in vehicular accidents caused by the negli-
gent driving of intoxicated, underage drinkers to sue the commercial vendors
who furnished the underage persons with alcoholic beverages. Recent com-
mon-law decisions8 have expanded the basis of liability of those who supply
alcoholic beverages. This note reviews the history of dram shop liability, ex-
amines the dram shop provisions of the Safe Roads Act, and explores recent
common-law developments.
At common law a person was not liable for harm caused by an intoxi-
cated person to whom he furnished alcoholic beverages.9 The rationale for
denying recovery was that "the drinking of the liquor, not the remote furnish-
ing of it, was the proximate cause of the injury."'10 In Sutton v. Duke"I the
North Carolina Supreme Court defined proximate cause: "In this jurisdiction,
to warrant a finding that negligence. . . was a proximate cause of an injury, it
must appear that the tort-feasor should have reasonably foreseen that injuri-
1. NAT'L CENTER FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PUB. No. 806-
269, ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT IN TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS: RECENT ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, 8 (1982). For purposes of these statistics, "alcohol-re-
lated" means an accident involving a driver or pedestrian with a blood alcohol concentration
greater than or equal to .01
2. Id at 6-7.
3. A. WILLIAMS, TEENAGE DRIVERS AND ALCOHOL USE (Insurance Inst. for Highway
Safety, Research Note * 101 1982).
4. N.C. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COLLISION REPORTS AND EVALUATION SECTION, TRAFFIC
DATA BRANCH, NORTH CAROLINA TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FACTS 1 (1982).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-120 to -129 (1983).
6. Safe Roads Act of 1983, ch. 435, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52, 89-92.
7. Id §37.
8. Chastain v. Litton Systems, 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 2454
(1983); Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, disc. rep. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305
S.E.2d 734 (1983).
9. Spencer v. Fisher, 161 N.C. 116, 76 S.E. 731 (1913) (dictum); Hutchens v. Hankins, 63
N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, disc. rep. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 395 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
10. Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 5, 303 S.E.2d 584, 587, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C.
191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
11. 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970).
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ous consequences were likely to follow from his negligent conduct."' 12 Be-
cause one can foresee that injurious consequences are likely to follow from
serving alcohol to an intoxicated or underage person, the concept of proximate
causation must embrace more than foreseeability. One commentator has ob-
served that courts sometimes rely on proximate cause to hold a defendant not
liable when the actual basis for the decision is public policy: "These cases
probably reflect a judgment that under the circumstances a wrongdoer other
than the defendant should be held responsible rather than a determination
that the risk causing injury is outside the scope of defendant's conduct. '1 3 The
policy determination that the real culprit is the individual consuming the li-
quor rather than the person furnishing it, is one explanation for the common-
law rule excluding the alcohol provider from liability. Many courts, however,
no longer adhere to the common-law rule. 14 These courts recognize a cause of
action against suppliers of alcoholic beverages either on the basis of negligence
per se' 5-violation of criminal statutes prohibiting the sale of such beverages
to minors 16 and visibly intoxicated persons' 7 -or ordinary negligence. t8
Because no action existed at common law, a number of states enacted
dram shop acts during the prohibition movement in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.' 9 Sixteen states presently have such laws.20 North Carolina enacted a
limited dram shop act in 1874;21 the General Assembly repealed this statute in
1971.22 Thus, no statutory basis for dram shop liability existed in North Caro-
12. Id at 107, 176 S.E.2d at 168-69.
13. Byrd, Proximate Cause in North Carolina Tort Law, 51 N.C.L. REV. 961, 971 (1972).
14. For a discussion of the common-law rule, its underlying rationale, and departures from
the rule, see Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 5-8, 303 S.E.2d 594, 587-89, disc. rev. denied,
309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
15. Negligence per se results from the violation of a statute designed to protect the class of
persons in which the plaintiff is included against the risk of harm that has occurred as a result of
the violation. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971); see also
Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 19, 303 S.E.2d 584, 595, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305
S.E.2d 734 (1983).
16. E.g., Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598,
217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968).
17. E.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 903 (1960); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973); Hutchens v. Han-
kins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
18. Chastain v. Litton Systems, 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2454
(1983); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31
N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973).
19. Dram Shop Liability I-Statutory Liability, FOR THE DEFENSE, Dec. 1973, at 129; Mo-
sher, Dram Shop Liability and the Prevention of Alcohol-Related Problems, 40 J. OF STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 773 (1979).
20. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1981); ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1980); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (1975); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.125 (Harr. Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1954); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 18.993 (Callaghan 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. GEN. OBLIO.
LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4399.01 (Page 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (Purdon 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-11-1
(1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972).
21. Act of Jan. 29, 1874, ch. 68, § 2, 1873 N.C. Sess. Laws 94.
22. Act of July 16, 1971, ch. 872, § 3, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1372.
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ina when the Safe Roads Act23 passed in 1983.
Although the portion of the Act dealing with dram shop liability24 creates
a cause of action traditionally unavailable at common law, it is limited in
scope. Dram shop liability is ordinarily strict liability.25 Section 18B-121(l)
of the North Carolina General Statutes, however, provides that a defendant
seller is liable only if he or his agent negligently furnishes alcohol to an under-
age person.26 Presumably, a defendant would have a defense against liability
under this statute if he reasonably relied on an identification card with a falsi-
fied birth date presented by an underage buyer.27
Another indication of the Act's restricted scope is that while many other
dram shop statutes compensate any alcohol-related injury,28 section 18B-
121(3) provides compensation only in cases of injury arising out of a vehicular
accident.2 9 The injury must also be caused by the impaired driving of a per-
son under the age required for the legal purchase of alcoholic beverages.30
Sales to persons over the drinking age that result in injury do not give rise to a
cause of action under the Act.
Even if these conditions are satisfied, section 18B-121(I) limits the class of
defendants who may be held liable under the Act to licensed suppliers of alco-
holic beverages. 31 Social hosts, therefore, are exempt from statutory liability.
Section 18B-123 also exempts certain enumerated classes of licensees.32
Although the dram shop provisions are limited in nature, a number of
provisions modify the common law. In cases of multiple defendants, anyone
furnishing a beverage will be liable if the beverage "contributes to, in whole or
in part, an underage driver's being subject to an impairing substance. '33 At
common law, when the combined negligence of several actors brought about a
23. Safe Roads Act of 1983, ch. 435, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52.
24. Id § 37.
25. Konsler v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. 111. 1968); W. PROSSER, supra note 15,§ 81.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(l) (1983).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § ISB-122 (1983) provides:
Proof of good practices (including but not limited to, instruction of employees as to laws
regarding the sale of alcoholic beverages, training of employees, enforcement techniques,
admonishment to patrons concerning laws regarding the purchase or furnishing of alco-
holic beverages, or detention of a person's identification documents in accordance with
G.S. 18B-129 and inquiry about the age or degree of intoxication of the person), evi-
dence that an underage person misrepresented his age, or that the sale or furnishing was
made under duress is admissible as evidence that the permittee was not negligent.
28. For example, courts have allowed recovery under the Illinois Dram Shop Act, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) when an intoxicated person fractured another per-
son's skull in a bar, Osborn v. Leuffgen, 381 Ill. 295, 45 N.E.2d 622 (1942), an intoxicated person
killed a bartender, Meade v. Boggiano, 127 Ill. App. 2d 344, 262 N.E.2d 310 (1970), and an intoxi-
cated person shot his wife, Edenburg v. Riggins, 13 Ill. App. 3d 830, 301 N.E.2d 132 (1973).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(3) (1983).
30. Id § 18B-121(l).
31. Id
32. Id § 18B-125. These include licensees who hold a: brown bagging permit, id § 18B-
1001(7), special occasion permit, id § 18B-1001(b), limited special occasion permit, id § 18B-
1001(9), special one time permit, id § 18B-1002, commercial permit, id § 18B-1100, or any com-
bination of the above.
33. Id § 18B-121(2).
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single, indivisible injury to a plaintiff, no one defendant was liable unless his
contribution to plaintiff's harm was "substantial" or "material. ' 34 The Gen-
eral Assembly presumably included section 18B-121(2) in the dram shop pro-
visions to reduce the inevitable litigation and confusion in cases involving
multiple suppliers of beverages. By requiring only that negligently supplied
alcoholic beverages contribute in some "part" to an underage person's impair-
ment,35 this section relieves a plaintiff of the burden of proving that the contri-
bution of any one defendant rises to the elusive level of "substantiality. '36
The dram shop provisions also permit recovery by an expansive class of
plaintiffs for a wide array of injuries. Compensable injury is defined as in-
cluding, though not limited to, "personal injury, property loss, loss of means of
support, or death."37 Under this provision, if an intoxicated, underage person
negligently causes an automobile collision, dependents of injured third parties
as well as the dependents of the intoxicated driver have a cause of action
against the seller of the alcohol for loss of support. Section 18B-121(2) makes
clear that a cause of action by dependents of the intoxicated driver is not
barred by the underage driver's contributory negligence: "Nothing in G.S.
28A-18-2(a) or subdivision (1) of this section shall be interpreted to preclude
recovery under this Article for loss of support or death on account of injury to
or death of the underage person. ' 38 The intoxicated, underage driver, how-
ever, does not have any cause of action against the seller because an "ag-
grieved party" under section 18B-121(l) "does not include the underage
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 433 (1965); W. PROssER, supra note 15, § 41.
Substantiality is a slippery concept usually defined in terms of what it is not--e.g., a match in a
forest fire. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 41.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(2) (1983).
36. The extent that § 18B-121(2) modifies the common law is uncertain. Read literally, this
section dispenses with causation in fact. In cases of multiple suppliers, the alcohol supplied by
any one will always contribute in some "part" to an underage person's impairment. Should liabil-
ity arise when an underage person drinks a small quantity of liquor at a second bar after consum-
ing such a large quantity of liquor at the first bar that the accident would have occurred in spite of
the contribution of the second bar?
The legislature created a cause of action under the Safe Roads Act based upon the negligent
sale of alcoholic beverages. In any negligence action a plaintiff must prove not only that the de-
fendant acted unreasonably but also that the defendant's conduct was the actual cause of injury.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965). Because the accident would have occurred de-
spite the contribution of the second bar, the alcoholic beverages served by the second bar owner
are not the actual cause of injury. Thus, under the common law, the second bar owner would not
be liable. Arguably, the same requirement of actual causation exists in the negligence action
created by the Safe Roads Act. If so, the effect of § 18B-121(2) is to relieve a plaintiff of the burden
of going forward with evidence that the contribution of any one defendant is substantial. A de-
fendant, however, would not be precluded from presenting evidence that the accident would have ''
occurred without its contribution.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(2) (1983). In contrast to this provision, which explicitly al-
lows recovery for economic harm, at common law if a person suffers loss as result of injury to
another, recovery is limited to compensation for harm to relational interests. W. PROSSER, supra
note 15, § 125. In a consortium action, for example, a spouse can recover only for loss of society,
comfort, and affection. See Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Mem. Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d
818 (1980).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(2) (1983). At common law, contributory negligence of the
underage driver barred recovery by his dependents or survivors for economic or relational losses.
W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 125.
1418 [V l. 62
person."39
Finally, section 18B-121(3) may also revise the common law. This section
provides that "[a]n aggrieved party has a claim for relief for damages against a
permittee or local Alcoholic Beverage Control Board if. .. the injury that
resulted was proximately caused by the underage driver's negligent operation
of a vehicle while impaired."'4 A literal reading suggests that a cause of ac-
tion will be recognized if the underage driver's negligent operation of his vehi-
cle rather than his impaired condition caused the plaintiff's injuries. In most
cases involving drunken driving, a person's impaired condition causes his neg-
ligent driving and the cause of injury is the alcohol negligently supplied. Sup-
pose, however, that an underage person was knowingly driving with bad
brakes, and that brake failure, rather than his impaired condition, caused the
accident. Under common law, the bad brakes would be the proximate cause
of injury, and the party furnishing alcoholic beverages to the underage person
would not be liable.41
Does section 18B-121(3) imply, however, that once an underage person
becomes impaired any subsequent accident caused by his negligence, whether
due to his impaired condition, will give rise to a cause of action against the
party who supplied the underage person with alcohol? The General Assembly
may have recognized that in a small number of cases an underage person's
impaired condition plays no part in bringing about an accident he negligently
caused. Thus, the General Assembly may have assumed that society's interest
in deterring drunken driving and minimizing litigation outweighs the defend-
ant's interests in these few cases. Perhaps the General Assembly consciously
decided to foreclose debate over the cause of accidents involving intoxicated
underage drivers. Read literally, section 18B-121(3) conclusively presumes
that an accident involving an intoxicated, underage driver is caused by his
drunken condition.
On the other hand, section 18B-121(3) can be read to stipulate that "the
underage driver's negligent operation of a vehicle while so intpaired" must be
the proximate cause of the injury.42 Arguably, the words "while so impaired"
require that impairment contribute to the negligent driving. Thus construed,
the statute requires that negligent driving due to impairment cause the injury.
In the context of a negligence action this construction is preferable.
In addition to the statutory cause of action created by the dram shop pro-
visions, a common-law cause of action is available under North Carolina law.
Section 18B-128 provides that "[t]he creation of any claim for relief by the
statute may not be interpreted to abrogate or abridge any claim for relief
under the common law."43 In two recent cases applying North Carolina law,
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(l) (1983).
40. Id § 18B-121(3) (1983).
41. See Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 156 S.E.2d 711 (1967); Pinyan v. Settle, 263 N.C. 578, 139
S.E.2d 863 (1965); Reason v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 259 N.C. 264, 130 S.E.2d 397 (1963).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(3) (1983).
43. Id § 18B-128.
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Hutchens v. Hankins44 and Chastain v. Litton Systems,4 5 courts have found
providers of alcohol liable for injuries caused by intoxicated drivers over the
age required for the legal purchase of alcohol-a situation outside the scope of
the dram shop provisions. In these cases, as under the statute, liability was
predicated on negligence.
In Hutchens the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a cause of ac-
tion against a tavern that served a large quantity of beer to an adult patron,
including some allegedly after he had become intoxicated. Fifteen minutes
after leaving the tavern, the patron's car collided with another vehicle, killing
plaintiff's husband and injuring plaintiff and her son.46 Plaintiff argued that
the tavern was negligent per se on the basis of the tavern's violation of North
Carolina General Statutes section 18A-34,47 which prohibited the sale of alco-
holic beverages by a licensee to a person known to be intoxicated. 4 8
The Hutchens court agreed with plaintiff that statutes giving rise to a per
se cause of action based on negligence do not create a new cause of action, but
establish a minimum standard for what constitutes reasonable care.4 9 For a
criminal statute to set a minimum standard of care so that its violation is negli-
gence per se, the court noted that the statute must be one to promote safety,
the plaintiff must be a member of the protected class, and the defendant must
be a person upon whom the statute imposes specific duties.50 The court con-
strued one of the purposes of section 18A-34 to be "the protection of the com-
munity at large from the possible injurious consequences of contact with an
intoxicated person."5 1 Because plaintiff was a member of the general public
and defendant was a licensee to whom the alcohol control laws applied, the
court adopted "the requirements of G.S. 18A-34 as the minimum standard of
conduct for defendant-licensees." 52 Therefore, defendant's conduct in selling
alcoholic beverages to a person known to be intoxicated was negligent per se.
The court, however, did not decide whether social hosts and off-premises re-
tailers were subject to liability, or whether an intoxicated person served alco-
holic beverages could recover for his own injuries.5 3
44. 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
45. 694 F.2d. 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2454 (1983).
46. Id at 3, 303 S.E.2d at 586.
47. This statute was repealed in 1981 but a similar statute is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-305 (1983).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-34(a)(2) (repealed by ch. 412, § 1, 1981 N.C. Session Laws 438)
49. Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 13, 303 S.E.2d at 592.
50. Id at 15, 303 S.E.2d at 593 (quoting Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828, 834
(D.C. Cir. 1973)).
51. Id at 16, 303 S.E.2d at 593.
52. Id
53. Id at 5, 303 S.E.2d at 587. The court did find that one purpose of the statute prohibiting
sales to persons known to be intoxicated was the protection of these persons from the adverse
consequences of intoxication. Id at 16, 303 S.E.2d at 593. Nevertheless, Hutchens recognizes a
cause of action based on negligent behavior. Thus, contributory negligence should bar recovery.
See Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965) (statute prohibiting sale of intoxicants to
intoxicated persons and giving rise to action for negligence does not eliminate defense of contribu-
tory negligence). Contra Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
Because N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-305(a) (1983) is violated only by "knowingly" selling to
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Prior to Hutchens the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit had concluded in Chastain v. Litton Systems 5 4 that the North Carolina
Supreme Court would impose civil liability on a licensee who violates a law
prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person.5 5 Defend-
ant in that case, however, was not a licensee but an employer who sponsored a
Christmas party during working hours for its employees, one of whom became
intoxicated and caused an automobile accident after leaving work.56 Because
defendant was not a seller of alcohol, plaintiff could not argue negligence per
se based on a violation of section 18A-34. Nevertheless, the court stated that
the laws prohibiting licensees from selling alcoholic beverages to intoxicated
persons "disclose state policy toward persons who dispense alcoholic bever-
ages in capacities other than as social hosts." 57 On the strength of this policy
the court upheld plaintiff's cause of action against the employer on ordinary
negligence principles:
[W]e conclude that Litton was negligent if it failed to exercise ordi-
nary care in furnishing . ..alcoholic beverages to Beck knowing
that he had become intoxicated. This negligence would be a proxi-
mate cause of Beck's collision with Chastain if Litton could have rea-
sonably foreseen that Beck, while intoxicated, would probably drive
his motor vehicle on a public street and cause a collision. 58
The Chastain rationale is broader than the principles of liability recog-
nized in Hutchens. The court allowed plaintiffs to recover despite the absence
of a statute explicitly proscribing defendant's conduct. The common-law ac-
tions recognized in Hutchens and Chastain supplement the enforcement mech-
anism established in the Safe Roads Act. They fill a void left by the Act's
failure to recognize a cause of action arising out of sales to adult patrons. The
extent to which these cases expand liability, however, depends on what poli-
cies the courts extract from the Safe Roads Act. If the policy behind the Safe
Roads Act is merely the protection of the general motoring public from the
dangers of drunken driving, the application of these cases will be limited.59
Whether state policy includes the protection of other members of the public, or
the intoxicated individuals themselves, must await further development. Al-
though both cases involved automobile accidents, the same negligence princi-
ples also should apply to other injuries caused by intoxicated patrons. An
innocent bystander injured in a barroom brawl, for example, should be able to
maintain a cause of action under the rules laid down in these cases.60 Further-
intoxicated persons, excluding off-premises retailers who have little opportunity to observe the
intoxicated state of customers is unnecessary to protect their interests.
54. 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2454 (1983).
55. Id at 961.
56. Id at 959.
57. I d at 961.
58. Id at 962.
59. Cf Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 16, 303 S.E.2d at 593 (purpose of laws prohibiting sale of
alcoholic beverages to persons already intoxicated is protection of community from injurious con-
sequences of contact with an intoxicated person).
60. In Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981), the North
Carolina Supreme Court recognized that injuries inflicted by intentional criminal acts of third
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more, these cases provide broader procedural protection than the Safe Roads
Act. Whereas a three year limitations period applies to common-law claims,61
the statute of limitations applicable to the dram shop provisions is one year.62
In conclusion, the common-law rule that a person is not legally responsi-
ble for harm caused by an intoxicated person to whom he furnished alcoholic
beverages has been substantially modified in North Carolina. The North Car-
olina General Assembly and courts applying North Carolina law have recog-
nized a cause of action against suppliers of alcoholic beverages. The dram
shop provisions are restricted in scope and apply only to sales to underage
persons. In contrast, the judicially recognized cause of action permits recovery
for harm caused by sales to persons over the drinking age. The negligence per
se theory adopted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Hutchens is
based on the violation of a statute prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages
to intoxicated persons. In Chastain the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit extracted from that statute a state policy that supports a cause
of action founded in ordinary negligence. Although these decisions already
provide a significant addition to the statutory cause of action, the ultimate
scope of the judicially created action depends on the way in which the North
Carolina courts construe state policy.
JOHN DAVID MAYBERRY
persons may be compensable in a negligence action. Foster upheld a cause of action against a
shopping mall by a shopper who was assaulted in the parking lot.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (1983) (the three year period does not accrue until injury
becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent, if the action is brought within
ten years).
62. Id § 18B-126. This section adopts the statute of limitations of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54
(1983), which provides for a one year limitations period.
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